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Clandestine Awards, Information




Among the numerous criticisms leveled at investor-state arbitration over the
years, it has almost become de rigueur to point out a lack of transparency. In this
arena ètransparencyæ refers to the extent to which the public may be aware of the
existence of a dispute, have access to key arbitral documents, or attend oral hear-
ings.1
The investment arbitration mechanism was modeled after commercial arbitra-
tion, where disputing parties were masters of the proceedings and generally favored
confidentiality. Gradually, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers started to con-
demn the emulation of the private model, highlighting that investor-state arbitration
is a distinct creature.2 Investment disputes repeatedly touch upon sensitive socio-
political concerns–which are normally absent from commercial arbitration.3 Arbi-
tral tribunals perform èa supranational review of state acts,æ scrutinizing the con-
duct of public entities against the standards of treatment prescribed in investment
treaties.4 The outcome of these proceedings may limit the state’s future legislative
and administrative freedom, thus affecting its ability to pursue public welfare poli-
cies.5 Because the controversy is so deeply interconnected with national policies,
its aftermath will inevitably have direct effects on the citizenry. At their core, in-
vestor-state disputes are a public affair; thus, conducting them away from commu-
nal scrutiny is unacceptable in democratic societies.
Concerns about a lack of transparency arise throughout the proceedings, from
the initiation of the dispute to the final award, as final arbitral awards are not always
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. This work was sup-
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1.SeeKatia Fach Gómez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration:
How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 510, 528 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Jack J. Coe Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes - Adoption,
Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339 (2006); Kyla Tienhaara,What You Don’t
Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the Environment in Developing
Countries, 6 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 73 (2006).
3. See Ross Buckley & Paul Blyschak, Guarding the Open Door: Non-Party Participation Before
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 353, 354
(2007); Filip Balcerzak & Jarrod Hepburn, Publication of Investment Treaty Awards: The Qualified Po-
tential of Domestic Access to Information Laws, 3 GRONINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 147, 148 (2015).
4. Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: a Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Ar-
bitration?, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 253,
255 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
5. KATEMILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND
THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 373 (2013).
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made public. The decision to publish the final award was traditionally in the hands
of the parties. However, this does not mean that arbitral awards are necessarily
either confidential or public, rather there is sometimes a tertium quid—awards that
are only available to some members of the investment arbitration èclanæ but not to
others.
This article argues that the existence of clandestine or semi-private awards un-
dermine the transparency of investor-state arbitration but also undercut the principle
of èequality of arms.æ In a nutshell, this principle èrequires that there be a fair
balance between the opportunities afforded the parties involved in litigation.æ6 Be
it at the domestic or international level, adjudication cannot be conceived without
the key ingredients of èprocedural fairness,æ èintegrity of process,æ or ègood ad-
ministration of justice.æ7 Thus, equality of arms is a quintessential principle in the
investor-state arbitration procedure.8 According to Wälde, this reflects a growing
èjuridificationæ of international judicial procedures and is part of a process by which
èthe material and procedural elements of the wider concept of the ärule of law’ find
increasing acceptance in the evolving proto-constitutional regime in the global
economy.æ9
Some of the implications of the inevitable link between international invest-
ment arbitration and the principle of equality of arms have received ample attention
from scholars. It has been noted that states may abuse their dual role as both sov-
ereigns and disputing parties, thereby impairing the required equality of arms.10
Authors have also discussed the tense relationship between the standard of review
to be applied by investment tribunals—which, some believe, should include a cer-
tain degree of deference to respondent states—and the need to ensure party equal-
ity.11
The existence of concealed arbitral awards that circulate among hand-picked
arbitration practitioners prevents public access to important arbitral decisions. In
addition, concealed awards further the existence of information asymmetries in the
market for arbitration services, potentially affecting different stakeholders and un-
dermining party equality. This feature of investment arbitration seems to be at odds
with the requirements of the rule of law, which is that accountable institutions must
make their decisions in a transparent manner, ensuring the predictability of their
rulings and the equality of the parties.12 While recent years have been marked by a
6. A Dictionary of Law (9th ed. 2018).
7. Thomas Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under the Shadow of the Dual
Role of the StateæAsymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, 26
ARB. INT’L 3, 11 (2010).
8. Id. at 38; Thomas Wälde, äEquality of Arms’ in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Challenges,
inARBITRATIONUNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTAGREEMENTS: AGUIDE TO THEKEY ISSUES 161
(Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010); ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEDURALASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 100 (2014).
9. Wälde, supra note 7, at 14.
10. Id.
11. See Stephan Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard
of Review, 3 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577 (2012); Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in
International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 545 (2014); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms:
Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 55 (2013).
12. See generally Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule
of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTLAWANDCOMPARATIVE PUBLICLAW 627 (Stephan Schill ed.,
2010).
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significant shift toward greater transparency, the existence of a considerable num-
ber of clandestine awards is remnant of the early days of investment arbitration,
when this dispute settlement mechanism functioned as an almost carbon copy of,
the typically confidential, commercial arbitration. Shining light on older and more
recent awards that remain in this state of concealment should be part of any plea for
an investment dispute settlement system in line with the fundamental tenets of the
rule of law.
Section II of this article explains how the current legal regime allows for the
existence of clandestine awards and discusses the negative consequences arising
therefrom. Section III examines how different actors are particularly affected by
this situation, from legal counsel to disputing parties and arbitrators. Section IV
proposes ways to address the issues discussed in the earlier sections. Section V
concludes by emphasizing that arbitration awards should be made equally available.
II. CLANDESTINEAWARDS
Most investment treaties contain no explicit legal obligation to make arbitral
awards public.13 This is the case with many older investment agreements. How-
ever, a younger generation of investment treaties provides for greater transparency
throughout the various stages of the proceedings, including the publication of final
arbitral awards and other key documents.14 Traditionally arbitration rules were also
silent in this regard, leaving the decision in the hands of the parties.
Pursuant to Article 48(5) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (èICSID Conventionæ), èThe
Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties.æ15 This norm
is restated in the Centre’s Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings.16 How-
ever, the same rule adds that è[t]he Centre shall, however, promptly include in its
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.æ17 As a result of these
provisions, the publication of the entire text of ICSID arbitral awards is dependent
upon the consent of the parties. When the Centre obtains such consent, it posts the
award on its website18 and reprints it in the ICSID Review–Foreign Investment Law
13. Balcerzak & Hepburn, supra note 3, at 150.
14. See, e.g., Article 38 of the Canada 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
https://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (last visited Sep. 25, 2019)
(awards shall be publicly available, subject to the deletion of confidential information); Article 17 of the
Norway 2007 Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ar-
chive/ita1031.pdf, (all awards and substantive decisions of the tribunal shall be made publicly available)
(last visited Sep. 25, 2019); Article 29 (e) of the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (mandates
publication of all orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal, subject to essential security exceptions
and to special procedures to protect confidential information–article 29) https://ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf (last visited Sep. 25, 2019).
15. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention Regulation and
Rules 25 (2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20convention%20eng-
lish.pdf.
16. Id. at 122.
17. Id.
18. ISCID Database, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases (last visited Sep. 25, 2019).
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Journal. To facilitate this result, ICSID frequently encourages disputing parties to
assent to publication.19
While the publication of excerpts of the legal reasoning of the tribunal is better
than nothing, such extracts only offer a piecemeal vision of the proceedings, pre-
venting a clear analysis of the mechanics of the panel’s decision-making process.20
The underlying factual context and legal reasonings are frequently obscured by the
fragmented selection of a few passages.21 While the rules prevent ICSID from pub-
lishing the award without the parties’ consent, they are silent regarding the actions
of the disputing parties themselves. As a result, it is not clear whether the parties
can disclose any documents, including the final award.22 In this regard, the North
American Free Trade Agreement has adopted a higher level of transparency,
providing that states or the investor may unilaterally make the award public.23
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (èUNCITRALæ)
Arbitration Rules, in its original 1976 version, provided that the award could be
made public èonly with the consent of both parties.æ24 The second version of the
rules, released in 2010, introduced a slight variation, stating that the award might
be made public èwith the consent of all parties or where and to the extent disclosure
is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation
to legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority.æ25 The adoption
of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion (èUNCITRAL Rules on Transparencyæ)26 in 2014 was a game-changer. As a
rule, all orders, decisions, and awards of the arbitral tribunal shall be made available
to the public,27 subject to some exceptions for the protection of confidential or pro-
tected information.28 The new rules apply to disputes arising out of èfuture trea-
ties,æ treaties concluded on or after the date the Rules–became effective, when in-
vestor-state arbitration is initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules unless
the parties agree otherwise.29 However, they can also apply to treaties concluded
before 2014, when parties to the relevant treaty, or disputing parties, agree to their
application.30 To incorporate the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency into the
19. NIGEL BLACKABY, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 355, 360-361 (Albert Jan van
den Berg ed., 2003).
20. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration? 22 AM. U. INT’T L. REV. 237, 257, n. 96 (2007).
21. Susan Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under Investment Treaties: Do In-
vestment Treaties Have a Bright Future 12 U.C. DAVIS J. OF INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 88 (2005).
22. Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Invest-
ment ArbitrationæThe Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 97, 100
(2007).
23. North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1137 and Annex 1137.4,
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-112.asp (last visited Sep. 25, 2019).
24. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules art. 32(5) (1976), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/un-
citral/en/arb-rules.pdf.
25. Id. at art. 34(5).
26. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/eng-
lish/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparency].
27. Id. at art. 3(1).
28. Id. at art. 7.
29. Id. at art. 1(1).
30. Id. at art. 1(2).
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, a new provision was added to the latter set of rules
and became effective April 1, 2014.31 A catch-all way for States to make the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency applicable to old investment treaties is by join-
ing the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (èMauritius Convention on Transparencyæ).32 However, states are not
exactly rushing to do so; since the convention became effective on October 18,
2017, only five countries have ratified it: Mauritius, Canada, Switzerland, Came-
roon, and Gambia.33
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency constitute the new golden standard of
transparency in the field of investor-state arbitration. However, it remains to be
seen to what extent disputing parties and contracting states will agree to submit their
disputes to this amplified level of transparency, given the unrestricted publication
of arbitral awards.
Moving from rules to practice, it is common for one of the disputing parties to
submit an award for publication in a journal or relay related information to news
media.34 While institutional rules do not establish any sanction for such unilateral
disclosure,35 once an award falls into the public domain it is frequently disseminated
in print and electronically. Although print-based sources are an important reposi-
tory of arbitral awards,36 internet databases are the main repository of arbitral deci-
sions. These online repositories are maintained by arbitral institutions,37 contract-
ing states,38 universities,39 scholars,40 practitioners,41 or commercial companies.42
31. Id. at art. 1(4) (For investor-State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty providing for the pro-
tection of investments or investors, these Rules include the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (èRules on Transparencyæ), subject to article 1 of the Rules on
Transparency).
32. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), United Nations Conven-
tion on Transparency, in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration art. 7(2) (2015), https://un-
citral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/transparency-convention-e.pdf.
33. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: United Nations
Convention on Transparency, in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (N.Y., 2014) (2021), https://un-
citral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/transparency/status.
34. Buckley & Blyschak;, supra note 3 at 150; Amanda Norris & Katina Metzidakis, Public Protests,
Private Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARV.
NEG. L. REV. 31, 48 (2010).
35. See Susan Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C.
L. REV 1, 19, n. 81 (2007).
36. Examples include ICSID Reports, the Stockholm International Arbitration Review, International
Legal Materials and NAFTA Arbitration Reports.
37. See supra note 15, at 122; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Cases (2021), https://pca-
cpa.org/en/cases.
38. See, Government of Canada, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - Chapter 11æ
Investment (April 5, 2019) http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/top-
ics-domaines/disp-diff/nafta.aspx?lang=eng; United States Department of State, NAFTA Investor-State
Arbitrations (2019), https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm; Franck, supra note 35, at 19 n. 82 (In coun-
tries that enacted statutes on freedom of information, governments are more likely to disclose an award
or consent to its disclosure).
39. See Oxford University, Investment Claims, http://oxia.ouplaw.com (last visited Sep. 25, 2019).
40. See Italaw.com, Investment Treaty Arbitration, https://www.italaw.com (last visited Sep. 25,
2019).
41. See, e.g., Todd Weiler æ Independent International Arbitrator, NAFTA CLAIMS,
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Sep. 25, 2019) (recording NAFTA investment arbitration re-
ports between 1999 and 2015, as maintained and updated by attorney Todd Grierson Weiler).
42. See, e.g., KLUWERARBITRATION, http://www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited Sep. 25, 2019);
INV. ARB. REP., https://www.iareporter.com (last visited Sep. 25, 2019).
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (èUNCTADæ) manages
the èInvestment Policy Hub.æ43 In April 2014, the UNCITRAL launched a Trans-
parency Registry for investor-state arbitrations, which made a broad range of arbi-
tral awards available.44 While some of these internet resources are open to every-
one, others require a subscription,45which may be a significant obstacle for scholars
and practitioners with limited financial resources.
Beyond those cases where one or both parties voluntarily circulate the final
award, the internet age also brought about new, informal gateways into information.
Herrmann coined the concept of ètransleakancyæ to refer to èquasi-transparency via
leaked documents.æ46 News on arbitration cases and even final awards are some-
times leaked, for instance, by watchdogs. Details about the specifics of arbitral
awards are also frequently discovered when successful investors seek to enforce
them in national courts.47
Due to either voluntary or involuntary disclosure, a large number of arbitral
awards are publicly available. However, this does not mean that the full text of
awards are always accessible. Occasionally, awards circulate within the legal com-
munity without identifying information. While these sanitized awards provide use-
ful substantive information, they offer no information about the parties’ identities
and the basic contours of the dispute.48 This raises the question of whether the
current state of affairs is consistent with the level of transparency required by the
tenets of the rule of law. The investor-state arbitration system is more transparent
than in its early days and awards are published more frequently.49 From this per-
spective, the vast majority of investment awards are currently available to the
43. INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org (last visited Sep.
25, 2019) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
44. TRANSPARENCY REGISTRY, UNCITRAL, www.uncitral.org/transparency-registry (last visited
Sep. 25, 2019).
45. See, e.g., Investment Claims, supra note 39; KLUWER ARBITRATION, supra note 42; INV. ARB.
REP., supra note 42.
46. Christoph Herrmann, Transleakancy, in TRADE POLICY BETWEEN LAW, DIPLOMACY AND
SCHOLARSHIP 39, 40 (Christoph Herrmann et al. eds., 2015).
47. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Tahyar, Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration after AMCO Asia Corp. v.
Indonesia: Watchword or White Elephant?, 10 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 93, 113 (1986); see also Norris &
Metzidakis, supra note 34, at 55.
48. Luke E. Peterson, All Roads Lead Out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute Settlement in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BALANCING
RIGHTS AND REWARDS 123, 130 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2005).
49. Franck, supra note 21, at 87; Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial
Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1319 (2006); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the -Have-
Nots+ in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 370 (2007); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler &Michele
Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention Serve as a Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in
Connection with the Introduction of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism?: Anal-
ysis and Roadmap,
CIDS–GENEVA CENTER FOR INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 15-16 (June 3, 2016), http://www.un-
citral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf (last visited Sep. 25, 2019); Daniel Magraw
et al., Ways and Means of Citizens’ Participation in Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures, SIEL INAUGURAL CONF., GENEVA 2008, Working Paper No. 53/08, at 17, https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159770 (last visited Sep. 25, 2019).
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public.50 Many awards become available very quickly51 and only a minority are not
in the public domain.52 However, the nonexistence of a single repository for invest-
ment awards53makes access to caselaw the most difficult task for those researching
in this field.54 Thus, there are still a significant number of decisions beyond the
reach of the public;55 publication of awards is not the rule but the exception.56
All in all, it can be said that while a lot of information is available, it is impos-
sible to know how much is not.57 In 2005, UNCTAD observed that the ètotal num-
ber of treaty-based investment arbitrations is impossible to measureæ and the actual
number of claims is èvery likely larger than what is known.æ58 This statement prob-
ably still holds true today, determining the percentage of arbitral awards that are
publicly available depends on quantifying the total number of arbitrations that have
reached the award stage, and that is practically impossible. The overall number of
disputes cannot be measured with accuracy because there is no legal requirement
that arbitral institutions maintain a registry of cases initiated. Of the major arbitral
institutions, only ICSID maintains a public registry of claims.59 In any case, it
would be impossible to determine exactly howmany proceedings take place ad hoc,
without any administering institution.60 Empirical data might be offered to substan-
tiate claims on both sides of the discussion, but it can always be refuted as incom-
plete and fragmented, leaving analysts to rely on their gut feeling.
What is undeniable is that the investor-state arbitration system is incomparably
more transparent than it used to be. In recent years, there has been an explosion in
the number of investment disputes,61 triggering a wave of public concern and aca-
demic curiosity for this branch of international law. There is now a large and well-
established community of practitioners, academics, think-tanks, and non-govern-
mental organizations closely monitoring every development in the law and practice
50. Franck, supra note 35, at 19 n. 84; DIEGO P. FERNÁNDEZARROYO, Private Adjudication Without
Precedent?, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONALLAWANDGLOBALGOVERNANCE 119, 129 (Horatia Muir Watt
& Diego P. Fernández Arroyo eds., 2014); Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaties and General In-
ternational Law, 57 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 361, 379 (2008).
51. ARROYO, supra note 50, at 131; Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Compara-
tive Public Law/An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
LAW 3, 18 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
52. Franck, supra note 35, at 19-20.
53. Id. at 18.
54. MARCI HOFFMAN & MARY RUMSEY, INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LEGAL RESEARCH: A
COURSEBOOK 287 (2d ed., 2012).
55. Balcerzak & Hepburn, supra note 3, at 148; Gottwald, supra note 20, at 257; James D. Fry, Inter-
national Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 115 (2007); Luke E. Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development
Policy-Making 13, 26 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., 2004).
56. HOFFMAN & RUMSEY, supra note 54, at 287; Blackaby, supra note 19, at 360; Gottwald, supra
note 20, at 256.
57. Susan Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration 17 LEWIS&CLARK
L. REV. 423, 427 (2013).
58. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES: A REVIEW 5-6
(2005), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/iteiit20054_en.pdf (last visited Sep. 2019).
59. See ICSID Database, supra note 18.
60. That is why Investment Policy Hub keeps a record of so-called èknown treaty-based investor-State
arbitrations.æ See UNCTAD, supra note 43.
61. See, e.g., UNCTAD’s Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, https://investmentpol-
icy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement (last visited Sep. 25, 2019) (listing 942 cases, 331 of which
pending; however, this number was not totally accurate as it did not include the disputes initiated in
2019).
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of investment law. To do so entails keeping abreast of the reasoning, mechanics,
and minutiae employed by arbitral panels in each new case. What is more, it does
not mean that older awards are being brought into the light either. Even if they lose
some freshness over time, ground-breaking decisions frequently become land-
marks, paving the way for consolidated doctrinal and jurisprudential streams. This
is not a matter of legal archaeology, it is one of comprehensive and consistent anal-
ysis of jurisprudential flows. It is difficult to identify a landmark when it cannot be
seen, just like it is challenging to take the right direction if road signs are hidden.
The current situation is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, this state of
semi-transparency prevents a comprehensive analysis and accounting of investment
treaty arbitrations,62 damaging the legitimacy of the dispute settlement mechanism
itself.63 Second, the fact that some awards remain private may affect the quality of
future decisions.64 Precedent is much more important in investment arbitration than
in commercial disputes.65 Investment disputes normally revolve around a limited
range of provisions pertaining to, inter alia, the meaning and scope of a short num-
ber of standards of treatment. Since fairly similar issues arise frequently, knowing
prior decisions is even more important,66 as new cases refine the issues.67 While
there is no formal system of binding precedent in investment arbitration, parties
often invoke and tribunals frequently examine and cite prior decisions when facing
similar issues of law or fact.68 Hence, previous investment awards have a persua-
sive,69 de facto,70 maybe even exaggerated,71 precedential value. Furthermore,
having access to previous awards allows arbitral panels to avoid inconsistencies by
taking into account the way previous tribunals dealt with similar questions.72 This
helps to enhance the efficiency, certainty, and predictability of the system, increas-
ing the confidence in the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.73
Third, arbitral awards also have a pedagogical effect. Because of their central
role in the law and practice of international investment, investors, governments, and
their counsels consider previous awards when planning and carrying out their in-
vestment strategies.74 They serve as points of reference that shape expectations
regarding future decisions, awards may even have a deterrent effect by preventing
unnecessary disputes.75 If investment awards are not accessible to anyone, they
offer no assistance in increasing the predictability of the system.76 From a broader
62. Peterson, supra note 55, at 13.
63. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 34, at 62.
64. Id. at 61.
65. Franck, supra note 21, at 73-75.
66. David Gaukrodger, Adjudicator Compensation Systems and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 5
OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV. 28-29 (2017), https://www.oecd-ili-
brary.org/docserver/c2890bd5-en.pdf?expires=1614159264&id=id&accname=guest&check-
sum=460C734517D7516A953ED358D000774B.
67. BLACKABY, supra note 19, at 360-61; Gottwald, supra note 20, at 256.
68. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 256; Roberts, supra note 11, at 53; ARROYO, supra note 50, at 128.
69. Peterson, supra note 55, at 27; Roberts, supra note 11, at 53; ARROYO, supra note 50, at 129.
70. Franck, supra note 21, at 73; ARROYO, supra note 50, at 129.
71. BLACKABY, supra note 19, at 360.
72. Franck, supra note 21, at 73-74, 87.
73. Knahr & Reinisch, supra note 22, at 111; Franck, supra note 21, at 89.
74. Franck, supra note 21, at 75, 87; see also Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1521, 1611-12 (2005).
75. Schill, supra note 51, at 18-19.
76. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 34, at 60.
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perspective, the unrestricted publication of awards will allow the community to be
aware of the potentially negative consequences of arbitral decisions on national in-
terests.77 If awards are not available to the common citizen, the general public’s
right to scrutinize the impact of the decision is hampered.78 This reason alone—the
right of citizens in truly democratic societies to know about decisions that may af-
fect them—should lead to a presumption of transparency, unless confidentiality can
be justified, in whole or in part.79
The regular publication of arbitral awards is crucial for the proper functioning
of the investor-state dispute resolution system. The current situation, where some
awards are public, but others are not, or at least not to everyone, affects the legiti-
macy of the institution itself and is also detrimental to its stakeholders—arbitral
tribunals, investors and governments, and the community at large. What is more, it
also has a nefarious impact on the functioning of the market for investment arbitra-
tion services, potentially undermining the principle of equality of arms. Such pe-
culiar negative consequences are discussed below.
III. INFORMATIONASYMMETRIES AND EQUALITY OFARMS
As discussed above, it is virtually impossible to determine the exact percentage
of investment awards that are not public. While some believe that most awards are
available to everyone, many others do not. However, things are not always black
and white, there is a grey zone where only a privileged few have access to select
arbitral awards. Like all shady businesses, it is difficult to offer empirical evidence
on the extension of this furtive or clandestine traffic, how many people have access
to how many of these secret awards is unknown. Still, several authors have pro-
vided anecdotal evidence of the existence of this underground market where arbitral
awards circulate within a closed circle of well-connected arbitration professionals,
or the èmagic circle.æ80 These practitioners may take advantage of such insider
knowledge to promote their work and advance their careers.81
The fact that some awards are not available to all interested parties under equal
conditions fosters the existence of an underground market for awards, undermining
the equality of arms between different participants in the investment dispute settle-
ment mechanism. Some stakeholders are not equipped with the same knowledge
about some awards that may be relevant for their work, favoring those inside the
magic circle and creating incentives to retain the status quo.
A. Legal Counsel
The existing information asymmetry in the arbitration market may affect dif-
ferent stakeholders. First, not all legal counsel are created equal, some have access
77. Franck, supra note 21, at 87.
78. BLACKABY, supra note 19, at 360.
79. Bernardo Cremades & David Cairns, The Brave NewWorld of Global Arbitration, 3 J. OFWORLD
INV. & TRADE 173, 197 (2002).
80. Franck, supra note 21, at 87 n. 151; Peterson, supra note 55, at 13.
81. Franck, supra note 35, at 19 n. 81.
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to unpublished awards while others do not.82 This creates a division between those
with inside knowledge, because they belong to a privileged professional network,
and those who have to rely on materials of public knowledge. The former has the
upper hand because they have access to a wider collection of authoritative case law
to devise their strategies and support their arguments, and thus a greater probability
of success.83 They can cite the most eloquent and influential excerpts word for
word, echoing the persuasive voice of previous tribunals. The latter see their right
to present the best possible case for their clients confined to perusing the conven-
tional case law that everyone else is familiar with.84
Inequities in legal representation are as old as the legal profession itself and
can be explained by market dynamics. However, they are aggravated by the unusual
existence of verdicts that are only within the reach of some, reinforcing the ad-
vantage of insiders over newcomers.85While initially there was a small, close-knit
community of lawyers working on a few sporadic investment cases, the expansion
of the caseload over the last decade attracted many new practitioners.86 The exist-
ence of secluded groups building on the expertise accrued over years of èinsider
trading,æ reinforcing their advantage in such a technical, specialized field of the law,
while hindering any expansion of the pool of legal counsel with sufficient savoir-
faire to become a credible alternative.
Lawyers working for one of the magic circle law firms with specialty practices
in investment treaty arbitration fortify their competitive advantage in various ways.
First, they work more often in investment cases than their competitors, acquiring
valuable experience and professional connections in the field.87 Second, they work
for firms that have built substantial institutional knowledge regarding previous ar-
bitration awards and the whole habitat surrounding investor-state disputes.88 Third,
major law firms frequently have privileged information about investment disputes
solved by a settlement agreement and may use this knowledge to persuade their
adversaries to do the same.89 Finally, some of the major international firms have
lawyers who engage in èdouble hatting,æ serving as arbitrators in other cases. Nat-
urally, wearing different hats provides these practitioners with a unique acumen of
the inner workings of arbitration, namely of how fellow arbitrators reason and de-
cide.90
èMagic circleæ law firms, also referred to as èbig law,æ spread in tandem with
the expansion of transnational trade and investment and the globalization of the
legal profession. They are the natural consequence of market dynamics, with legal
work increasingly requiring specialized knowledge and cross-border expertise.
However, the existence of clandestine awards may encourage the development of
an underground market for unpublished awards, either through information leaks or
82. Franck, supra note 21, at 87 n. 151; Peterson, supra note 55, at 26; Luke Peterson, BIT award
against Russia being challenged in Swedish appeal court (Oct. 27, 2004), https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/investment_investsd_oct27_2004.pdf; Gottwald, supra note 20, at 257.
83. BLACKABY, supra note 19, at 360-61; Rogers, supra note 49, at 357.
84. BLACKABY, supra note 19, at 360.
85. Rogers, supra note 49, at 357.
86. Stephan Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International In-
vestment Law, 22 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 875, 887-88 (2011).
87. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 252.
88. Id.
89. Peterson, supra note 55, at 16, 26; Gottwald, supra note 20, at 253.
90. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 253.
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the emergence of private libraries for the benefit of a few well-established members
of the legal profession.91
B. Disputing Parties
The current situation affects legal counsel that do not have access to un-
published awards but also, and perhaps more importantly, their clients, who are de-
prived of the best possible legal representation in highly specialized disputes,
thereby creating a fundamental imbalance between disputing parties92 This perpet-
uates an information asymmetry and a power imbalance between parties who can
afford to hire one of the magic circle law firms and those who lack the necessary
financial resources.93 Disputing parties who are unable to retain highly sophisti-
cated and seasoned counsel face an uphill battle.94 This problem may affect re-
sponding states and investors alike. Poor, developing counties and small, inexperi-
enced companies are especially vulnerable.95
Developed countries normally have adequate resources and legal expertise in-
house to mount a capable defense in investment arbitration.96 Developing coun-
tries’ governmental departments, on the other hand, may lack the necessary
knowledge and experience to defend their interests as vigorously.97 Unable to af-
ford the often stunning billable hours charged by outside counsel,98 responding
states may have no choice but to turn to government lawyers who are sometimes
little more than apprentices in the field of investment law and arbitration. Such
legal counsel may not be familiar with the relevant case law, let alone unpublished
awards.99 This has led to appalling inequality in the quality of legal representation
between powerful multinational investors and low-income respondent states.100
The only silver lining in this scenario is that some developing nations acquire con-
siderable expertise in the process.101 This expertise takes several years to build and
may be costly if such lessons are learned through consecutive, expensive defeats.102
Fearing the potentially disastrous results of this èdo it yourselfæ attitude, many
developing nations retain outside counsel to defend investment treaty claims.103
However, this option also has costs. In 2005, then Secretary-General of the ICSID,
Roberto Dañino, noted that the growing costs of arbitration was a source of concern,
adding that è[t]his is particularly true for the low-income countries, and for a few
91. Elina Zlatanska, To Publish, or Not to Publish Arbitral Awards: That is the QuestionM, 81 INT’L
J. OFARB., MEDIATION&DISP. MGMT. 25, 26 (2015). Beyond the scope of this chapter is the question
of how the handling of unpublished awards may constitute a breach of rules of professional conduct. A
legal counsel may, for instance, fail to disclose an unpublished award which might adversely affect his
case or be prohibited from disclosing an award that might positively impact his case because he is under
an obligation to keep it confidential. See Franck, supra note 21, at 87, n. 151.
92. Franck, supra note 21, at 88.
93. Peterson, supra note 55, at 26.
94. SeeWälde, supra note 7, at 179.
95. Id.
96. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 253.
97. Franck, supra note 21, at 92; Peterson, supra note 55, at 26; Gottwald, supra note 20, at 257-58.
98. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 254.
99. Id. at 260.
100. See id. at 255.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 257.
103. Id. at 253-54.
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small companies, which cannot afford being represented by the most experienced
and sophisticated law firms in the field, as claimants usually are.æ104 If they turn to
local law firms, governments are frequently faced with lawyers who also lack the
necessary expertise and are strangers to the magic circle. They too will struggle to
find relevant precedent and may ignore the precious precedential value of clandes-
tine awards.105
Amicus curiae participation could assist respondent states in their defense by
introducing legal arguments not addressed by the host state in its submissions.106
However, most non-governmental organizations and civil society groups with ade-
quate funding and technical expertise are based in developed countries.107 Local
amici may be unfamiliar with unpublished awards. The inability of some respond-
ent states to access clandestine awards may even have negative effects that extend
beyond the confines of a particular case. If states are unsure about how arbitral
tribunals might apply standards of treatment in the future, their policy response
could be limited or even frozen out of fear of future lawsuits.108
Claimants, or foreign investors, are not necessarily in a better position than
responding states. It is true that in most disputes, foreign investors secure legal
representation from one of the major international law firms,109 thereby accessing
the privileged information within the magic circle. This is the case with repeat
players, multinational companies that, through multiple court appearances, amass
substantial proficiency and experience in investor-state arbitration. However, small
companies who are inexperienced with international arbitration may struggle to ac-
cess clandestine awards. These problems are aggravated when the responding state
is represented by a major law firm.110
Overall, it can be said that clandestine awards may affect investors and states
alike, but this problem is especially acute for lower-income states, that have more
to lose than investors111 and risk the payment of hefty compensations without access
to relevant authority to defend their case.
C. Arbitrators
As previously discussed, the nonpublic status of some awards may affect the
work of arbitral panels, preventing them from finding guidance and inspiration in
prior decisions and avoiding potential inconsistencies. However, the private
104. Roberto Dañino, Opening remarks by Robert Dañino, MAKING THE MOST OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A COMMON AGENDA (2005) http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalin-
vestmentagreements/36053800.pdf (last visited May 9, 2020).
105. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 255-56.
106. Id. at 258; On the advantages and drawbacks of amicus curiae participation in investment arbitra-
tion, see Fernando Dias Simões, Friends with Benefits? Amicus curiae in the TPP Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, in PARADIGM SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RULE-MAKING: TPP
AS ANEWMODEL FOR TRADEAGREEMENTS? 105 (Julien Chaisse et al. eds., 2017).
107. Gerard Clark & Alan Thomas, Nongovernmental Organizations, Civil Society, and Development
Governance, in INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTGOVERNANCE 415-6 (Ahmed Shafiqul Huque & Habib
Zafarullah eds., 2006).
108. Fry, supra note 55, at 115; On the so-called äregulatory chill’, see Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory
Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW ANDARBITRATION 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
109. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 253; Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 34, at 66.
110. Fry, supra note 55, at 115.
111. Id.
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circulation of these clandestine awards affects the work of arbitrators by inhibiting
the development of their arbitration careers. Clandestine awards are not the exclu-
sive possession of legal counsel–they also circulate informally among arbitrators.112
This favors the creation or maintenance of another èmagic circle,æ that of a few
well-connected adjudicators.
Investment arbitrators are individuals who sell their services as adjudicators to
disputing parties in the market.113 They belong to an elite pool of legal professionals
with diverse backgrounds. While the number of individuals working in investment
arbitration is growing,114 there is still a narrow pool of experts with sufficient ex-
pertise and experience.115 This pool is manifestly insufficient to address the chal-
lenges of an astounding increase in the number of investment proceedings over the
last few years. In addition, there is a sort of vicious circle in the arbitrator appoint-
ment process, where reputation attracts cases and cases build reputation. The fol-
lowing question arises: How can the renewal and enlargement of the pool of arbi-
trators be promoted by including younger practitioners and providing them with
suitable opportunities to acquire experience and knowhow? Experience can only
be accumulated through practice. However, if the system relies too much on expe-
rience, symbolized by prior appointments, it leads to a chicken and egg situation
where newcomers are excluded from the possibility of arbitrating because they do
not have enough experience, but they are never given the chance to acquire more
experience. The system ends up reinforcing this vicious circle, narrowing down the
pool of suitable candidates to a point where the individuals being appointed are
always the same, increasing the demand for their services and reinforcing their po-
sition in the market.
Developing a solid reputation as an arbitrator depends on the perceived quality
of the awards rendered. Awards are strong signals to the market for arbitration
services.116 Disputing parties and appointing institutions examine prior awards
carefully when pondering potential appointments. Arbitrators know that what they
say in each award not only produces an effect within the strict limits of that partic-
ular dispute but can also have an impact on future cases and prospective appoint-
ments.117 This kind of strategic signaling is, to some extent, inevitable—arbitrators
are aware that what they say can benefit or harm themselves. That is, of course, if
their words are ever read, the existence of clandestine awards protects arbitrators
and their work from public scrutiny.118 Their work cannot be judged by the legal
community at large, but only by a few arbitration insiders. This may have a chilling
effect on up-and-coming arbitrators, preventing them from exposing their talent
consistently and furthering their careers. In addition, parties are also deprived of
112. See Peterson, supra note 55, at 26; Gottwald, supra note 20, at 257.
113. Michael Goldhaber, The Rise of Arbitral Power over Domestic Courts, 1:2 STAN. J. OFCOMPLEX
LITIG. 373, 406-07 (2013).
114. Meg Kinnear, ICSID and International Investment Treaty Arbitration: Progress and Prospects, in
CHINAAND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTLAW: TWENTYYEARS OF ICSIDMEMBERSHIP 9, 21 (Wenhua
Shan & Jinyuan Su eds., 2015).
115. Sergio Puig, Emergence and Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Ar-
bitration and International Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 531, 594 (2013).
116. Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Invest-
ment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 86 (2010).
117. Roberts, supra note 11, at 53.
118. Norris & Metzidakis, supra note 34, at 60.
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important samples about the quality of potentially suitable alternative arbitrators.119
Only a systematic publication of arbitral awards would provide a full picture of the
arbitrators available in the market and enable a thorough assessment of their deci-
sion-making patterns.120
Finally, the existence of nonpublic awards inhibits the unique opportunity to
train current and future arbitrators.121 Aspiring and inexperienced arbitrators may
struggle to build professional experience without the ability to rely on some of the
most authoritative case law to support their arguments and decisions, instead they
must rely on the conventional case law that is ordinarily available to all arbitrators.
Just like in the case of legal counsel, this ends up reinforcing the magic circle phe-
nomenon.
In addition, this problem reinforces the existence of so-called èprivate arbitra-
tion clubsæ by diminishing the possibility that some legal counsel will also act as
arbitrators. Functioning as an investment arbitrator does not require exclusivity, as
investment arbitration is not functionally specialized.122 As a result, many lawyers
offer their services in the market for dispute resolution services in other capacities.
There is a high degree of role reversibility; investment practitioners may appear in
some proceedings as arbitrators, while in others they act as counsel.123 This situation
is recurrently described as the èdouble hatæ124 or èmultiple hatæ phenomenon.125
Again, younger, inexperienced legal counsel may be prevented from advancing
their professional careers and develop a consistent practice as an arbitrator.
IV. REDRESSING THE IMBALANCE
The previous section demonstrated that the existence of secret arbitral awards
promotes the existence of information asymmetries in the market for arbitration
services, potentially undermining the equality of arms between different partici-
pants in the investment dispute settlement mechanism. The fact that some stake-
holders are not equipped with the same knowledge about certain awards that may
be relevant for their work favors those inside the magic circle and creates incentives
119. Id.
120. Kapeliuk, supra note 116, at 52.
121. Alexis Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in
International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 1019 (2001); Francois Dessemon-
tet, Arbitration and Confidentiality, 7 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 299, 302 (1996); Norris & Metzidakis,
supra note 34, at 61.
122. José Costa,ComparingWTOPanelists and ICSIDArbitrators: the Creation of International Legal
Fields, 1 Oñati Socio-Legal Series, SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF ADJUDICATION OF INT’L ECON. DISP. 1,
22 (2011).
123. Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, The Revolving Door in International In-
vestment Arbitration, 20 J. of Int’l Econ. L. 301 (2017); MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH,
RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 58, n. 151 (2015);
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Past, Present and Future of the International Law on Foreign
Investment, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTLAW: TWENTYYEARS OF ICSIDMEMBERSHIP
(Wenhua Shan and Jinyuan Su eds., 2015).
124. Langford, Behn & Lie, supra note 123.
125. NATHALIEBERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER&DIANAROSERT, INVESTMENT TREATYARBITRATION:
OPPORTUNITIES TO REFORM ARBITRAL RULES AND PROCESSES 13 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.,
2014).
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to retain the status quo. In a time when there are so many calls for diversity in
international adjudication,126 this problem merits careful attention.
The past few years have brought about a fresh and much-needed wave of trans-
parency in the realm of investor-state arbitration. In the future, more and more
awards will become publicly available thanks to the operation of more modern in-
vestment treaties, arbitration rules, and the growing application of the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules. Still, many older investment treaties contain no explicit legal
obligation to make arbitral awards public. Contracting States should strive to
amend these instruments to enshrine a public right of access to information, subject
only to strict limitations regarding genuinely sensitive information. Instead of do-
ing this for every single treaty, states may simply ratify the Mauritius Convention
on Transparency, making the rules applicable to all their investment treaties con-
cluded before April 1, 2014, insofar as the other party or parties to the treaty have
done the same.127
States can also address this problem by enacting domestic laws on freedom of
information, requiring the public disclosure of arbitral awards—again, subject to
the necessary safeguards for the protection of confidential business and governmen-
tal information. The same result can be achieved with investors through the con-
clusion of investment contracts that require the publication of any awards resulting
from potential disputes. Finally, if the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules are not
applicable already, respondent states should agree to their application in each new
arbitration, but this consent would not bind the claimant.128
Arbitral institutions also have an important role to play. As indispensable
stakeholders in the market for international arbitration services, they should con-
sider amending their rules in a way that encourages disputing parties to consent to
the public disclosure of final awards.129 Not only does this enhance public percep-
tions about the transparency and accountability of arbitral institutions but it also
allows them to showcase the quality and quantity of their caseload.
The ICSID, the leading provider of investor-state dispute settlement services,
has been discussing the reform of its arbitration rules and regulations since 2016.
One of the potential areas for amendment is the publication of arbitral awards. Pres-
ently the ICSID Convention does not authorize the Centre to publish the award
without the consent of the parties.130 A reform of the ICSID Convention is not on
the table, and so the rule will be maintained.131 Still, the Centre is discussing a
potential amendment of article 48(4) of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Pro-
ceedings, which currently shadows the provisions of the convention.132 The new
126. See generally Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy
of International Courts? 12 CHICAGO J. OF INT’LL. 647 (2012); Susan Franck et al., The Diversity Chal-
lenge: Exploring the Invisible College of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L.
429 (2015); Cristina Florescu, Report on the Diversity Roundtable at Vienna Arbitration Days 2018, 8
L. REV. INT’L J. OF L. & JURIS. 42 (2018).
127. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 26, at 5.
128. See id.
129. Franck, supra note 35, at n. 81; Franck, supra note 21, at 88.
130. ICSID, supra note 15, at 25.
131. ICSID, BACKGROUNDER ON PROPOSALS FORAMENDMENT OF THE ICSID RULES (ICSID 2018).
132. ICSID, supra note 15, at 122.
15
Dias Simões: Clandestine Awards, Information Asymmetries, and Equality of Arms
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
332 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2021
rule 61, entitled èPublication of Awards and Decisions on Annulment,æ reads as
follows:133
(1) With consent of the parties, the Centre shall publish every Award, sup-
plementary decision on an Award, rectification, interpretation, and revi-
sion of an Award, and decision on annulment.
(2) The parties may consent to publication of the full text or to a jointly
redacted text of the documents referred to in paragraph (1).
(3) Consent to publish the documents referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
deemed to have been given if no party objects in writing to such publica-
tion within 60 days after the dispatch of the document.
(4) Absent consent of the parties in accordance with paragraphs (1)-(3),
the Centre shall publish excerpts of the document. The following proce-
dure shall apply to publication of excerpts:
(a) the Secretary-General shall propose excerpts to the parties within
60 days after the date upon which a party declines consent to publica-
tion of the document;
(b) the parties may send comments on the proposed excerpts to the
Secretary- General within 60 days after their receipt; and
(c) the Secretary-General shall consider any comments received on
the proposed excerpts, and publish excerpts within 30 days after re-
ceipt of such comments.
The proposed rule reiterates that awards cannot be published without party con-
sent, reflecting the current practice. However, the novel third paragraph deems the
parties to have consented to publication of the award if they do not object, in writ-
ing, within 60 days after dispatch of the award. This means that parties can still
object to publication, in which case the Centre will publish excerpts of the legal
reasoning in the award, following a specific new procedure and timeline contained
in the fourth paragraph. Only time will tell if the parties will consent, either ex-
pressly or impliedly to publication more frequently than before.
As the major institution administering investor-state disputes, it is only natural
that ICSID approaches any drastic reform cautiously. While acknowledging that
many submissions from stakeholders èsupported greater transparency in principle,æ
it also recognizes that some states èexpressed a wide variety of positions on which
documents should be public.æ134 The Centre recalled that member states of the
ICSID Convention have èvarious options . . . to calibrate the level of public access
to documents in ICSID cases: they can ratify theMauritius Convention, add specific
transparency provisions to their investment instruments or endeavor to reach con-
sensus on the level of transparency in individual cases.æ135 ICSID also emphasized
that disputes èarise out of investment contracts and laws, and not just treaties. The
transparency regime adopted should be suitable to cases based on all of these dif-
ferent types of instrument.æ136 All in all, ICSID believes that the current proposals
133. ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 64, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Dis-
putes, Working Paper No. 3 (2019).
134. ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 870, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Dis-
putes Secretariat, Working Paper (2018).
135. Id. at 872.
136. Id. at 873.
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èensure that the most important documents and information are made available to
the public and that documents and information which are properly confidential or
otherwise protected are not disclosed to the public.æ137
Another way of promoting public access to arbitral awards would be the crea-
tion of a legal assistance center specialized in investor-state arbitration. This idea
has been floated for some time as a tool to promote equality of arms in investor-
state arbitrations involving low-income nations.138 In 2009, UNCTAD proposed
the creation of an institution èthat developing countries could draw on for support
in investment law and investor-state disputes.æ139 This legal assistance center could
be modeled after the Advisory Centre on World Trade Organization (èWTOæ)
Law,140 which was created specifically to advise developing nations in trade dis-
putes at the WTO.
A legal assistance center could help to diminish information asymmetries in
the market for legal representation in investment arbitration141 by serving as a re-
pository for both published and unpublished tribunal awards.142 Such a facility
would also help to prepare domestic lawyers in developing countries to engage in
investment law disputes, thus mitigating the current advantage of disputing parties
that can retain the legal counsel of the magic circle.143
A market for legal services where some disputing parties, arbitrators, and legal
counsel have access to unpublished awards while others do not seems to skew the
playing field in favor of the former, tarnishing the basic idea that should preside
over any form of adjudication, that there must be an equality of the parties. This
creates a gap between insiders and outsiders, favoring the creation and maintenance
of magic circles and private clubs. Investment arbitration may have its historical
roots in commercial arbitration, but market dynamics are harder to explain and ac-
cept when they get in the way of healthy competition between legal professionals.
Clandestine awards are a form of insider trading that gives some participants an
unfair advantage in a highly technical and specialized field of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Access to arbitral awards should be equal to all, regardless of their experience,
professional or informal connections. The full text of arbitral awards should be
accessible to the public and the whole legal community, subject only to the neces-
sary safeguards for the protection of confidential business and governmental infor-
mation. This is possible in most cases and requires only certain exceptions to the
137. Id. at 347.
138. See IISD, IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: NEGOTIATORSHANDBOOK 56 (Int’l Inst. For Sustainable Dev., 2005); Gottwald, supra
note 20, at 264; Franck, supra note 21, at 93; Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 435, 484 (2009); Susan Franck, The ICSID EffectæConsid-
ering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VIRGINIA J. OF INT’L L. 825, 911 (2011).
139. UNCTAD, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 12 (United Na-
tions Conf. on Trade and Dev., 2009).
140. See Advisory Center on WTO Law, at http://www.acwl.ch; see also Kim van der Borght, The
Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 733 (1999).
141. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 138, at 484.
142. Gottwald, supra note 20, at 269.
143. See Franck, The ICSID Effect, supra note 138, at 911.
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rule, which may be accomplished by redacting parts of an award.144 The publication
of arbitral awards that omit the parties’ name but contain the arbitrator’s identifica-
tion, the relevant facts, and the legal reasoning, would potentially contribute to the
development of the investment arbitration services market and, more broadly, of
investment law and practice.
144. Knahr & Reinisch, supra note 22, at 115.
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